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Abstract 
This paper examines how opinion-shaping political and civil service stake-
holders view the role and contribution of Special Political Advisers (SpAds) 
within the Westminster system of government. The literature only recently 
paid considered attention to this role, partly due to the recent reforms that 
spawned the emergence of SpAds, but also because political advisers still only 
represent a small population within the government community. It is ac-
knowledged that each country’s institutional and administrative traditions 
greatly influence SpAds’ tasks; arrangements with the UK being no exception. 
Recognising that SpAds take on the role of “temporary civil servants” whose 
duties vary according to ministerial direction, the study reported in this paper 
concludes that SpAds can make an invaluable contribution to policy delivery 
by acting as a bridge between Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary. The 
capability to bridge the tensions between ministerial urgency to realise policy 
goals and civil servant realism to accurately assess the “fracture points” to be 
overcome in the process of policy delivery is reported as particularly valued 
by the public official. This paper concludes that the SpAd’s relentless pursuit 
of the Minister’s agenda is distinctly counterproductive for both Minister and 
civil servant, but adopting the function of bridging across contrasting inter-
ests enhances policy delivery effectiveness.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades there has been a growing conceptual and empirical 
interest in the role and contribution of ministerial advisers (Fawcett and Gay, 
2010; LSE GV314 Group, 2012; Shaw and Eichbaum, 2014; Hustedt et al., 2017). 
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Emergent evidence suggests that ministerial advisers are playing an increasingly 
important role in modern democracies (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD, 2010); Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010; Hustedt et al., 
2017). In the UK, special advisers are widely known as SpAds. In certain coun-
tries, SpAds are appointed for their professional expertise, and media and com-
munications acumen, rather than as strategic advisers on matters of policy 
(OECD, 2010; Richards and Smith, 2016). In other countries where a tradition of 
impartiality predominates, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, SpAds 
“keep” civil servants out of politics while enabling Ministers to find pathways 
through the growing complexity of power structures and the pitfalls of policy 
execution (OECD, 2010). As Peters et al. (2000: p. 21) noted, institutions and 
administrative traditions greatly influence specific SpAd tasks and arrange-
ments, and these are “embedded in each country’s mix of constitutional, cul-
tural, political and administrative milieu”. The UK, has witnessed an increase in 
SpAds (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2015a; Mangset and Asdal, 2019). The UK civil 
service has undergone numerous reforms and changes since the late 1980s. The 
Next Steps initiative created agencies intended to be at “arm’s length” from min-
istries. These agencies maintain their own leadership, recruitment, and pay sys-
tems, as well as an independent governance through boards composed of senior 
ministry officials and outside non-executive directors, servicing the Minister 
(Cline, 2008; Page, 2010; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2019). Yet, the introduction of new 
technologies and the consequences of both globalization and devolution have seen 
certain writers promote the view that, despite all the changes, the civil service “did 
not actually undergo a revolution” (Cline, 2008: p. 158). Lodge (2010: p. 109) ar-
gues that despite cutbacks and criticisms of poor performance the civil service is 
“bouncing back” with Whitehall now experiencing a state of “normalization”. 
Within this setting of extensive external change but supposedly limited impact 
on the functioning of Whitehall, scant attention has been given to the role and 
contribution of SpAds despite their steady increase in numbers (Shaw and 
Eichbaum, 2015a). One reason for the limited attention to SpAds is the view that 
political advisers represent a small population within the government commu-
nity and that it is civil servants who mostly and significantly interact with Min-
isters concerning policy development and execution (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2014; 
Connaughton, 2015). In contrast, others claim that the SpAd role and relation-
ship with both the political class and the civil service is under-theorised (Eichbaum 
and Shaw, 2010). Shaw and Eichbaum (2015a) suggest that the Westminster-cen- 
tred, first-wave SpAd analysis has sparked calls for a comparative and theoretical 
second wave of more intense scholarly scrutiny. 
Thus, the purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to review the current in-
sights and understandings of SpAds within the Westminster context and their 
impact on a non-partisan civil service (Gay, 2000, 2009; Yong and Hazell, 2014; 
Christensen and Opstrup, 2018) second, to present our findings from our study 
of the role, contribution, and impact of SpAds on the functioning of govern-
ment. We conclude by emphasising the invaluable contribution SpAds make to 
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the process of policy delivery and in so doing highlight areas for future research. 
2. Growing Numbers and Influence of SpAds 
The rise of what appears to be a “third element” in executive government has 
certain writers considering that a challenge is posed to the idealised politics- 
administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887). The cornerstone to the purpose and 
existence of public administration rests on the premise that politics is substan-
tially distinct from a public administration, and that there exists a hierarchal re-
lationship between the two (Wilson, 1887). The politics-administration dichot-
omy assumes public employees are “impersonal” and “apolitical”, in the sense of 
having no political interests or political affiliation in their public role (Wilson, 
1887).  
Wilson (1887: p. 210) argued that the “administration lies outside the proper 
sphere of politics” and that “administrative questions are not political ques-
tions”. He further held that, “although politics sets the task for administration, it 
should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (Wilson, 1887: p. 210). It is this 
distinction that enables civil servants to “speak truth to power” (Wildavsky, 
1979). Wilson (1887), in line with his contemporary German jurist, Bluntschli 
(1880), made the case for the separation of administration from both politics and 
the law. Thus the “Wilsonian” “arm’s-length” model of bureaucracy, where ad- 
ministration is separate from the legislative body, forms the basis of the conven-
tional model of government in Britain and Continental Europe (Rose, 1986: p. 
4). This model operates along two dimensions: political control in the form of 
setting direction and maintaining oversight of policy by elected representatives, 
and an administration exceeding their professional independence in the process 
of policy execution (Connaughton, 2010; Öhberg et al., 2017). Such comple-
mentarity is based on the assumption that “both politicians and senior civil ser-
vants are highly dependent upon each other in terms of accomplishing their in-
dividual tasks in government, but simultaneously retain distinct roles” (Con-
naughton, 2010: p. 42; Svara, 1999, 2001; Richards and Smith, 2016). Few would 
argue that Ministers in the UK are considerably dependent on their officials as 
they do not have significant private offices or cabinets other than a limited 
number of SpAds (Blick, 2004). Most Westminster Ministers rely on the civil 
servants they inherit to put into effect the policy commitments that they are ac-
countable to deliver (HCPACAC, 2018). 
3. SpAds in the UK Government 
Unlike their equivalents in the US, Germany, and Sweden who occupy positions 
with signiﬁcant executive powers, UK-based SpAds do not hold formal executive 
power. They are not alone in this, as governments in Australia, New Zealand, 
Ireland, and Canada position their SpAds in a similar fashion (Eichbaum and 
Shaw, 2010; Page, 2010; Hustedt and Salomonsen 2017). The reason for this is 
that the UK has its own unique conventions (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010) rather 
than being driven by a formally written constitution (House of Commons Li-
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brary, 2018). 
In the UK government, a SpAd is defined as “a person that holds a position in 
the civil service serving the UK, Scottish or Welsh Governments and whose ap-
pointment to that position meets the appropriate requirements” (Cabinet Office, 
2016: p. 2). As such, SpAds are “temporary” civil servants, personally appointed 
by a government minister (Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010: 
Section 15). The Fulton Committee (1968) review of the Civil Service stipulated 
that SpAds should be “men and women of standing and experience”. SpAds are 
expected to either bring an up-to-date specialist knowledge beyond that available 
in-house or assist the Minister to stay in touch with the world beyond Whitehall, 
or both (Cabinet Office, 2010b). The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers in-
troduced in 2001 (and further revised in 2003, 2005, 2010b, 2015 and 2016, 
Cabinet Office, 2016: p. 2), states that the SpAd role is to assist “Ministers on 
matters where the work of Government and the work of the Government Party 
overlap and where it would be inappropriate for permanent civil servants to be-
come involved”. Thus, SpAds are an “additional resource for the Minister pro-
viding assistance from a standpoint that is more politically concerned than 
would be available to a Minister from the permanent Civil Service” (Cabinet Of-
fice, 2010b: column 1082). While they are guided by the Code of Conduct for 
Special Advisers (Cabinet Office, 2015b), SpAds are not politically impartial and 
are expected to support the political as well as the communications work of their 
Minister when related to their Minister’s department (Gay, 2010; Cabinet Office, 
2015b; Jenkin, 2012). The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers (Cabinet Office, 
2010a, 2016: p. 2) states that SpAds are able to “request officials to prepare and 
provide information and data, including internal analyses and papers”.  
The tasks and duties undertaken by SpAds vary from Minister to Minister and 
range from deciding which relationships to handle and how, to suggesting new 
initiatives and giving a political flavour to public servants’ proposals in keeping 
with the Secretary of State’s aims and objectives (Marsh et al., 2000; Fawcett and 
Guy, 2010; LSE GV314 Group, 2012). In return, the Ministerial Code states that 
Ministers are both “responsible” and “accountable” for their SpAd’s manage-
ment and conduct (Public Administration Select Committee (PASC, 2012)). It is 
the Minister’s responsibility to ensure that their advisers understand their role, 
the limits to their discretion to act, and the standards required from their per-
formance (PASC, 2012; Cabinet Office, 2017a). Thus their dependency on their 
political masters is compared by Patapan (2012: p. 6) to Machiavelli’s prince 
“their goodness depends on the nature of the prince”. The PASC Chair, Bernard 
Jenkin (MP), observed that SpAds’ positive contribution is “heavily dependent 
on a high degree of trust between them, their Ministers and their Permanent 
Secretaries, so there must be clarity of expectations about tasks and boundaries” 
(Parliament UK, 2012: p. 2).  
In practice, advisers may pose both a solution and a problem in the design and 
operation of political/administrative relations (Table 1). When such relation-
ships are dysfunctional, unproductive working conditions and public scandals  
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Table 1. Minister, SpAd, and civil servant roles. 
Characteristic Minister SpAds Civil Servants 
Highest title 
Secretary of the State 
(political head of department) 
Political adviser 
Permanent Secretary 
(Administrative Head of 
Department) 
Numbers in 20171 118 88 
423,0002 (of which less than 
1% is Senior Civil Service) 
Salaries in 2017 
£155,796 
(Cabinet Minister £79,721 
plus MP £76,011)3 
£65,000 - £140,000 
Median £69,000 (and £72,000 for 32 
SpAds who work for the Prime Minister) 
Median £25,900 (March 2017) 
Ascendance to office Elected politicians (mainly) Appointed official Appointed official 
Loyalty to Party Minister first, party second 
Must serve any government of 
any party. No political 
allegiance to be displayed— 
neutral/impartial— 
“neutral on the government side” 
Public visibility High public profile 
Publicly accountable 
Potentially visible outside, 
as well as within, Whitehall 
Anonymous—expected to offer 
confidential and neutral advice, 
behind closed doors 
Function Runs department 
Works for the Minister 
and government 
Works in department 
Role 
Makes political decisions/policy 
A number of inter-related roles 
(advancing/defending the Government; 
management role) 
Provide party political assistance 
Reviewing papers, checking facts 
from a party-political viewpoint 
Contributing to policy planning 
Briefing party MPs 
Liaising with outside interest groups 
Advice on policy 
Prepare legislation 
Drafting answers to 
Parliamentary questions 
Implementing and managing 
policy 
Proactive guardians of propriety 
within their departments 
Responsibility to 
Parliament, for their actions and for 
policies directly associated with them, 
as well as for the actions and 
behaviour of their SpAd(s) 
Minister Minister 
Tenure 
Politician-Until next election 
Reshuffling of the Cabinet by 
Prime Minister—average 2 years 
Temporary civil servant—dependent 
on ministerial tenure and favour 
Permanent—do not change at 
time of election 
The average tenure in post for 
members of the SCS is 2 years 
(HCPACAC, 2018) 
Statutory guidance Ministerial Code (2018) 
Code of Conduct for 
Special Advisers (December 2016) 
Civil Service Commission (2015) 
and Civil Service Management 
Code (2016) 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
 
 
1House of Commons Library (2018), Limitations on the number of ministers, Briefing Paper, Number 03378, 10 August,  
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03378/SN03378.pdf. 
2“Whitehall”, i.e. the “head offices” of most ministries, accounts for about 9% of all civil servants. 
3Combined Ministerial and Parliamentary salaries. The basic annual salary for an MP from 1 April 2017 was £76,011. MPs also receive expenses to 
cover the costs of running an office, employing staff, having somewhere to live in London and in their constituency, and travelling between Par-
liament and their constituency. Salaries of Members of Her Majesty’s Government July 2016,  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561941/ministerial_salaries_july_2016_update
d_17_10_16.pdf. 
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are likely outcomes (Hood and Lodge, 2006; Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010; Tiernan, 
2007; Laughrin, 2014). Sir Alan Walters, adviser to Margaret Thatcher, clashed 
publicly with Chancellor Nigel Lawson, resulting in both men resigning and, in 
turn, contributing to the Prime Minister’s downfall a year later (Travis et al., 
1989). For Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s press secretary, “duties” included 
embroidering intelligence dossiers (Cameron, 2012).  
From such experiences and according to Hope (2012), certain MPs, such as 
Gareth Thomas who was at the time Shadow Cabinet Office Minister, perceived 
the increased number of SpAds as a “spadocracy” (Cabinet Office, 2015b) while 
Labour MP John Mann saw them as “spinocracy” (Table 2). In contrast, others 
took a more positive view and positioned SpAds as a “mini-profession” that de-
serves serious attention (Hazell et al., 2012; Hustedt and Salomonsen, 2017).  
The Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b: Section 3) stipulates that 
“all special advisers must uphold their responsibility to the Government as a 
whole, not just their appointing Minister”. It was also recognised by PASC 
(2012: p. 3) that “the position of special advisers is a sensitive one”, as “they oc-
cupy influential positions within Whitehall and have the potential to destabilise 
the relationship between ministers and officials”. Despite the establishment of 
contracts and codes of conduct (Cabinet Office, 2015b, 2016), SpAds continue to 
perform slightly blurred and amorphous roles that provoke speculation and in-
cur the irritation of some. Bernard Jenkin MP (Jenkins, 2012) argued that SpAds 
should be neither “shady characters practising the political dark arts” nor “po-
litical bag carriers” for elected members. 
Irrespective of the threat posed by or value gained from SpAds, there is a his-
tory of them progressing to various leading roles within Parliament and the Ex-
ecutive (LSE GA314 Group, 2012; Glencross, 2015; Mangset and Asdal, 2019). 
The forerunner to the modern day SpAd, Thomas Cromwell, was first Henry 
VIII’s adviser before he ascended to a ministerial role (CSW, 2009; History Ex-
tra, 2014). In more recent times, David Cameron ascended from SpAd to the 
role of Prime Minister, George Osborne to Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nick 
Clegg to Deputy Prime Minister, Ed Miliband to Labour leader, David Miliband 
to Foreign Secretary, and Ed Balls to Shadow Chancellor. In a similar fashion, 
Lord Andrew Adonis, Jack Straw, James Purnell, and Oliver Dowden all as-
cended to Secretary of State posts (LSE GA314 Group, 2012; Glencross, 2015; 
HCPACAC, 2018). In these cases, the SpAd experience acted as an apprentice-
ship allowing the individual to acquire the political skills not only to advance 
their ministerial career but also to learn how to operate effectively within the 
Whitehall system and sensitively interact with the media (Riddell et al., 2011; Kidd 
and RoseI, 2017). The route from SpAd to Minister as noted by Riddell et al. (2011: 
p. 28) “has been more common on the Labour than on the Conservative side”.  
In effect, SpAds occupy a narrow space between elected politicians and the 
formal structures of the civil service (Hazell et al., 2012; Christensen and Op-
strup, 2018). However, SpAds carry with their role referent power and the au-
thority of the Minister they serve. Referent power is rooted in the affiliations one  
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Table 2. Governments and SpAds numbers. 
Prime Minister Government SpAds 
Kings and 
Prime Ministers 
Various governments through the ages 
 Without any formal system, Kings, Prime Ministers and individual 
Ministers brought in particular advisers. Such advisers were friends, 
cronies, colleagues. 
 Until 1920, personal and political appointees were commonplace 
serving in the Prime Minister’s private office (Jones, 1978). 
Harold Wilson 
 Labour government, 1964-1970 
 Labour government, 1974-1976 
 Formalised SpAd-specific roles and job titles (Wilson, 1976: p. 98). 
 Appointed as temporary civil servants, “experts” such as 
Thomas Balogh. 
 The term “Special Adviser” (SpAd) commonly used for the 
first time in 1975. 
 Ministers allowed to appoint SpAds on a regular basis. 
 38 SpAds in 1974, dropped to 24 in 1976. 
James Callaghan Labour government, 
1976-1979 
 Surrounded himself with shrewd academic advisers. 
 Reduced number of SpAds from 29 to 24 (Knight, 1990: p. 105). 
Margaret Thatcher Conservative government, 1979-1990 
 Initially hostile to political advisers, as opposed to expert advisers 
(Burch, 1983). 
 20 SpAds in the early days 
John Major Conservative government, 1990-1997  38 SpAds in 1997. 
Tony Blair New Labour administration, 1997-2007 
 Between 70 and 84 SpAds during his office (70 in 1998; 82 in 2004). 
 SpAds increased in numbers; greater influence over career civil 
servants; perceived privileged position as policy shapers. 
 Two SpAds, Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell, 
were given executive powers over civil servants. 
Gordon Brown New Labour administration, 2007-2010 
 73 SpAds in 2008. 
 74 SpAds in 2010. 
David Cameron 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, 2010-2016 
 98 SpAds in 2013. 
 103 SpAds in 2014/5 (increase was following the decision by the then 
Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, to expand his political operation). 
 92 SpAds in 2015 reduced to 83 (one SpAd in Downing 
Street and 11 from the key Whitehall departments). 
Theresa May 
Conservative government 
 2016-2017  88 SpAds in 2017. 
Source: Table draws together different sources of information, including Cabinet Office 2017a; Cabinet Office 2017b; Cabinet Office 2017c; and designed by 
the authors. 
 
derives from the groups and organisations to which one belongs (Raven, 1965; 
Kidd and RoseI, 2017). Thus, the ethos of the SpAds association with the Minis-
ter becomes, to some degree, his/her ethos. In hierarchical relationships, those 
who have real or perceived power, such as having access to their superior, have 
influence. SpAds have that access to the Minister, while civil servants are in-
creasingly becoming devoid from such intimate access. 
Based on the work for the Royal Commission, Australian Government Ad-
ministration, and earlier work by Walter (1986), Smith (1976: p. 305) concluded 
that the position of adviser is anomalous as it holds that the “relations between 
ministers and their public service advisers do not provide for the easy in-
ter-positioning of policy orientated ministerial staff” (Smith, 1977: p. 149). The 
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considered view is that the advisers’ presence “disrupts accepted patterns of bu-
reaucratic influence” irrelevant of “how skilled and tactful ministerial advisers” 
may be (Smith, 1977: p. 149). Thus, SpAds mediate the zone between poli-
tics—which is about setting policy and making decisions on how to best meet 
the publics’ need—and policy execution (Whitaker, 2000; Kidd and RoseI, 2017). 
The former is an activity that is inevitably partisan, complex, and sometimes 
controversial, and it rests within the domain of an elected politician, the Minis-
ter (Whitaker, 2000; Inwood, 2009; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2019). The Minister’s 
duty is to debate, politicise, and communicate policy through their party’s manifesto 
and make pertinent decisions (Inwood, 2009). The latter is the task of public 
administration and rests in the domain of civil servants (Whitaker, 2000). Thus, 
despite the scrutiny undertaken, the role of SpAds continues to be subject to 
ongoing debate concerning their task, role, contribution, numbers, and cost 
(House of Commons, 2018). 
4. The Study 
This study explores how the SpAd—an elite actor appointed according to minis-
terial discretion—contributes to policy design and delivery. The focus on the 
SpAd illuminates a spectrum of other actors—Prime Minister, Ministers, de-
partmental boards, senior civil servants, arm’s-length agencies—all of whom 
play a role in shaping and coordinating policy. Using a combination of pur-
posive and snowball sampling techniques, individuals who could provide in-
sights relevant to the inquiry were targeted by the researchers (Bryman, 2012; 
Tansey, 2007). A total of 81 confidential, elite interviews (Delaney, 2007; Kaka-
badse and Louchart, 2012) were carried out with current and former Secretaries 
of State, Junior Ministers, SpAds, Permanent Secretaries, Directors Generals and 
other civil servants, non-executive directors on departmental boards, chairper-
sons/CEOs of arm’s length bodies and outsourcing agency executives in the pe-
riod from late 2016 to early 2018. During interviews, we were exploring the 
blockages at senior level to policy delivery. In transcribing the interviews, the use 
of gendered pronouns has been amended to ensure confidentiality for all parties 
involved. The term “elite” in this study refers to a heterogeneous group of actors 
who have inﬂuence at the highest decision-making levels in government and re-
lated bodies regarding policy formulation and execution. We consider the SpAds 
as elite because the role is strategically positioned between Minister and civil 
servant (Burt, 1992).  
We conducted inductive data analysis identifying themes emergent from the 
interview transcripts (Smith et al., 2009). The analysis employed a broad the-
matic discourse framework, where ﬁndings were based on the recurrent themes, 
patterns, and categories that surfaced in the transcribed conversations (Deacon 
et al., 2007). We employed the process of “close reading”, which requires a de-
tailed reading and re-reading of the text (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009) with 
importance being given to the lived experiences of the respondents, which 
A. P. Kakabadse, N. K. Kakabadse 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2020.102016 242 Open Journal of Political Science 
 
shaped their perceptions of the role, challenges, and contribution of SpAds 
(Langdridge, 2007). Content was then coded to identify and label emergent 
themes. Themes were derived by combining and comparing the thematic 
ﬁndings from all participant groups (Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012). The final 
thematic structure was agreed following detailed collaboration between the two 
authors, who discussed and reanalysed any discrepancies as well as confirmed 
themes and ensured that the selected quotes were representative. The four 
emergent themes are now outlined with representative quotes from the inter-
views.  
5. Study Findings 
As stated, four themes emerged from analysis: 1) ministerial self-responsibility, 
2) Ministers’ mistrust of civil servants, 3) civil servants’ service to the Minister, 
and 4) urgency versus realism, which gives rise to the bridging function of the 
SpAd. Although there may be some overlap across these themes, we hold them 
conceptually apart, drawing out key implications. 
Ministerial self-responsibility 
Participating Ministers expressed two contrasting views concerning the role, 
contribution, and value of SpAds. One perspective is that SpAds are useful in 
carrying out the Minister’s bidding across a variety of stakeholder groups. Min-
isters acknowledged that they are under pressure to act rapidly, as much dictated 
by the electoral cycle, limited ministerial tenure, and media pressure, all con-
tributing to exercise the “urgency of the political imperative”. SpAds are viewed 
as being responsive to such demands through easing the pressure on the Minis-
ter as well as producing a buffer between them and other stakeholder groups.  
“Those advisers in whom I had faith acted promptly and appropriate- 
ly.”—Secretary of State. 
“It was me that sorted out those relationships between him [the Minister] and 
those others. I am not sure he is fully appreciative of the lengths I had to go 
[to]…”—SpAd. 
Thus, SpAds promoting the Minister’s agenda, protecting the Minister from 
reputational damage and, albeit to a lesser extent, coordinating with other SpAds 
to push through policy or seek inter-party agreement emerged as key elements of 
the SpAd’s role as desired by the Minister. The coordination role, however, was 
often described as promoting the Ministers’ partisan agenda and safeguarding 
their reputation. It was certainly clear that the SpAd’s role is fraught and com-
plex, and highly dependent on ministerial discretion. 
The alternative view offered by Ministers was that of a distinct distaste for 
SpAds. Criticism focused on other Ministers who were viewed as not accepting 
responsibility for their own actions and decisions as well as displaying the per-
sonal weakness of “hiding” behind the SpAd. The distaste for SpAds centred on 
them acting as a shield behind which the Minister can “manipulate” a way for-
ward in order to realise their own agenda. Ministers criticised Ministers, par-
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ticularly when advice comes from the SpAd rather than the impartial perspective 
offered by civil servants. 
“They [SpAds] are a menace. Their Minister, even worse, hiding behind the 
SpAd and not having the guts to address challenges openly. When the Minister 
needs Rottweilers [referring to SpAds] we all know things ultimately will go 
wrong.”—Secretary of State. 
“I do find these special advisers quite unnecessary. They are little more than 
the outward ego of the Secretary of State. Making the Secretary of State look 
good when that very same person does not have the strength to do his own dirty 
work. These SpAds play on that to the maximum.”—Secretary of State. 
Our findings confirm that SpAds are seen to play the role of policy wonks, 
enforcers, fixers (as suggested by LSE GV314 Group, 2012), as well as acting as 
political “sherpas” (according to Shaw and Eichbaum, 2014 and Askim et al., 
2017). Inadvertently, our study identified SpAds’ support for the Ministers in 
terms of the need for “ego-boosting” (Young and Sloman, 1982: p. 88) but not 
acting as a “medieval fool”. Rather, SpAds are used by certain Ministers to pro-
tect themselves and minimise the tarnishing of the Minister’s reputation. 
Ministers’ Mistrust of Civil Servants 
The majority of Ministers in the study expressed their trust in civil servants. 
However, there was a significant minority who declared a mistrust of civil ser-
vants and for that reason drew on the services of SpAds to aggressively push the 
Minister’s agenda. In response, certain SpAds have vigorously and aggressively 
pursued the ministerial agenda, which observers viewed as being to the detri-
ment of those directly concerned, including the Minister. The push to realise 
ministerial urgency was considered as particularly damaging for civil servants. 
The attitude and behaviour of the SpAd were described as between “over-assertive” 
and “aggressive”. 
“[I]f they simply see their role as enforcers for the Minister and are not capa-
ble of being sufficiently open and intelligent enough to make their own assess-
ment and then guide their Minister or Secretary of State accordingly. They’re not 
up to the job.”—Permanent Secretary. 
The unwelcome impact of certain SpAds is reported by others than civil ser-
vants. 
“The Special Advisers have their own agendas, slightly out of control … 
the Minister has significantly reduced the number of Special Advisers and I 
think that’s been a very positive thing.”—Non-Executive Director, Departmental 
Board. 
Yet other respondents indicate that the unwelcome “pushy” behaviour of 
SpAds is now more a phenomenon of the past. Since the last election (2017), the 
style of the SpAd is seen to have become more facilitative. Paying greater atten-
tion to their listening skills and a greater willingness to work with the Permanent 
Secretary to genuinely explore how policy could be better delivered is seen as the 
current approach taken by certain SpAds. Permanent Secretaries see this devel-
opment as positive.  
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“[T]he Civil Service has largely adjusted to that now, and mostly for the better 
in my experience. The relationship with Special Advisers is a productive one. 
They can provide a political insight which civil servants typically are less able to 
do.”—Permanent Secretary. 
“My best friend. I now probably spend more time with the SpAd, having a 
coffee and trying to see how the message should be positioned to the Minister’s 
advantage. For me they are invaluable.”—Permanent Secretary. 
Most interviewees agreed that the more thoughtful, cooperative, and facilita-
tive the SpAd, the better the quality of advice to the Minister. In the opinion of 
the respondents, the damaging circumstances of the past appear to have changed 
in the summer of 2017 after the Prime Minister dismissed her two most senior 
aides, Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy, in response to complaints made that these 
SpAds held undue power at the centre of government (Elgot and Mason, 2017). 
Fiona Hill and Nick Timothy were known for their confrontational style, with 
certain MPs complaining they acted more like Deputy Prime Ministers than un-
elected advisers (Elgot and Mason, 2017).  
Where concern with SpAds still prevails is their involvement with the lower 
ranks of the Civil Service. One Permanent Secretary reluctantly acknowledged 
that, despite improvements, civil servants lower in the hierarchy are exposed to 
undue “spAd aggressive behaviour”. 
“They can be enormously helpful and really help officials … There are others 
who just strike fear and terror into the hearts of civil servants and diminish the 
competence of the whole organisation and I’ve certainly come across a good 
number of those.”—Permanent Secretary. 
“Well, they’re a very mixed bag. There are some who are absolutely out-
standing… and there are some who are completely destructive forces within the 
Department for whatever reason … There are other ones who are bad because 
they very tightly control access to the Secretary of State.”—Permanent Secretary. 
The interviewees considered that both Minister and civil servants should give 
greater attention to SpAd appointment criteria. Further, following Cabinet re-
shuffles, certain SpAds move to other departments accompanying their Minister. 
Such moves are acknowledged as not being based on functional knowledge or 
skills, but rather on the nature of the trusted working relationship between the 
Minister and the SpAd.  
Servicing the Minister 
All of the civil servant respondents strongly declared their belief in represen-
tative democracy and their devoted support to the Minister who is viewed as the 
fundamental building block of representative democracy. In providing service to 
the Minister, a number of interviewees stated that being attuned to the Minister 
requires building a broad network of trusting stakeholder relationships, which 
can be called upon to facilitate the Minister realising his/her objectives.  
“I think one of the strengths of civil servants, which is largely hidden from 
Ministers, is that civil servants were always very good about their wider rela-
tionships. Their ability to have the connections in the fields—they know they go 
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to people who could either reinforce the argument they wanted to push or stop 
the Minister doing something.”—Secretary of State. 
“I want the Minister primarily to be clear about the direction they want to go 
in, provide the appropriate framework for us to work in, to appropriately chal-
lenge but actually at a level that recognises that the people who are responding 
want to deliver what Ministers want them to deliver.”—Permanent Secretary. 
Concerning civil servant support of the Minister, Barberis (1996: p. 91) con-
cludes that, given the pivotal role of Permanent Secretaries, “no one can swing a 
whole department behind a major policy initiative as can a Permanent Secre-
tary”. The respondents noted that the role of Permanent Secretary is that of chief 
adviser, chief conduit of advice to Ministers, as well as being orchestrator of pol-
icy and the strategic managers for the department. 
In their support of Ministers, numerous civil servants reported the lengths 
they go to consistently and cohesively work with SpAds. In order to minimise 
the SpAd negative effect, certain Permanent Secretaries report that they act as a 
“buffer” between the SpAd and the staff of their department. 
“I also make it very clear to them that if they’ve got a problem with any of the 
work that the staff are doing that they should tell me about it, not the staff. What 
you don’t want is a Special Adviser shouting at your staff because that’s not the 
way to get the best out of people…”—Permanent Secretary. 
In contrast, other Permanent Secretaries highlight that certain SpAds have 
made a positive contribution. 
“[T]here’s three types really. There’s the type that is very influential with a 
Secretary of State but regard their relationship with the Department as a com-
bative one. There are the ones who are very influential with the Secretary of State 
but regard their relationship with the Department as an important and collabo-
rative one. And there are ones who aren’t that influential with the Secretary of 
State and aren’t having as huge an impact on the department in any case.” – 
Permanent Secretary 
Despite perceived improvements in SpAd attitude and behaviour, disquiet 
remains concerning the privileged access political advisers have to Ministers po-
tentially permitting the inappropriate usurpation of executive authority (Parlia-
ment UK, 2012; Wicks, 2002). In effect, the behaviours of certain SpAds con-
tinue to be unwelcomed.  
Urgency versus Realism: The Bridging Function of SpAds 
The most valued SpAds are those who make it their priority to engage with 
Minister and Permanent Secretary in particular, and other civil servants and 
relevant stakeholders when faced with conflicting and contradictory agendas. 
The predisposition of the Minister is that of urgency—to have policy delivered 
within the time frames stated or implied. The focus of the civil servants is that of 
“realism”, namely to accurately assess the landscape and spread of misaligned 
agendas facing the Minister so as to ensure for greater engagement from varying 
stakeholders that the policy in question can be effectively delivered. Those 
SpAds that find ways to engage with “both sides”, despite conflicting interests, 
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act as a bridge and through so doing are considered the most effective. They are 
reported as being warm, good listeners, reflective, intellectually sharp, and real-
istic about “manoeuvring” through a landscape of contradictory interests. This 
study highlights that SpAds can greatly contribute to bridging this chasm 
through working closely with senior civil servants who often have more knowl-
edge and experience of the department. 
“If it were not for my relationship between my Secretary of State and that 
other one, we would have resulted in a complete breakdown… through both 
Permanent Secretaries I got the various parties talking.”—SpAd. 
Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) question whether the advent of SpAds has recon- 
ﬁgured the balance between independence and responsiveness, and question 
how the expectations and risks posed by these agents are managed. Our study 
highlights that this depends predominately on the discretion of the Minister as 
well as that of the SpAd, and to some extent the discretion of the Permanent 
Secretary. SpAds are in a position to carefully weigh up the Minister’s and civil 
servant’s advice against their own moral and ethical principles and make their 
own judgement and, in so doing, advise the Minister, and at times the Perma-
nent Secretary, concerning the best course of action to take in that specific con-
text.  
In effect, the role of SpAd attracts a range of comment according to the style 
and tactics adopted and the context in which discretionary action is played out.  
“I had to confront him [the Secretary of State] and say without me you would 
be facing a disaster. These others are not too difficult to handle. It’s keeping him 
[the Secretary of State] in touch.”—SpAd. 
While in the past, Permanent Secretaries saw themselves as the 'broker' be-
tween the Minister and the department (Rouban, 2012), SpAds are emerging as 
partly fulfilling this role in acting as the bridge between the Minister and the 
Permanent Secretary. Especially this is the case when faced with a delicate party 
matter where the Minister feels it desirable to use a personal confidant to carry 
out brokerage negotiations. 
6. Conclusion 
SpAds’ ability to balance the accuracy of policy assessment (i.e. civil service in-
put) with the urgency for achieving ministerial outcomes is recognised as in-
valuable by civil servants. In contrast, SpAds who exclusively pursue ministerial 
desires spawn unwelcome conflict and tension with often undesired conse-
quences for the Minister and civil servants. This finding in some ways provides 
an answer to Eichbaum and Shaw’s (2010) question concerning whether the ad-
vent of political staff has reconﬁgured the balance between independence and 
responsiveness, and how the expectations and risks posed by these agents are 
managed.  
SpAds, however, face what Dror (1985: p. 193) calls “inherent” dilemmas, that 
of providing “objective estimates and professional analysis” (the content) and 
adjusting to “the emotional needs of the recipient or to his possible emotional 
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reactions”. Effective SpAds are ones who work through Dror’s (1985) inherent 
dilemma; that of building relationships and bridges through the establishment of 
trust with the Minister as well as with other stakeholders, especially civil ser-
vants.  
Ultimately, the policy process is political, involving value judgements and de-
bates about collective action and therefore has an irreducible political and dis-
cretionary element to it. The role of SpAd emerges as “bridging” the Minister 
and the civil servant, and other stakeholders, rather than being a broker acting as 
“middleman between the social science, bureaucratic and political decision-making 
worlds” (Francesca and Stoker, 2011: p. 495). The challenge will be in choosing 
between Minister and civil servant when the policy delivery pathways run in 
contrasting directions. Such dilemmas are worked through, or not, by the ethical 
framework of the SpAd. How to tell the Minister that their course of action is 
ill-advised is by nature no easy matter.  
What this study concludes is that SpAds have “a very good friend” in the 
Permanent Secretary and together they can position messages that enhance the 
Minister’s interests. When that is impossible, the Minister’s interests must pre-
vail; a point fully appreciated by the civil servant irrespective of their views on 
best pathway for policy delivery. The SpAd who makes a positive contribution 
emerges as the one who concludes the Minister’s agenda must be pursued when 
all other avenues have been explored, rather than enforcing such an agenda 
without a full examination of context. It is the examination of context and the 
understanding of how to engage across misaligned interests that surfaces the 
pathway of how to best execute the Minister’s agenda. The SpAd’s sensitivity to 
such a process makes them trusted by the critical players involved.  
Our study shows the importance of SpAds being the strategic mediation be-
tween the Permanent Secretary/civil service team and the Secretary of State. The 
reason for mediation is due to two contrasting interpretations of time. The Sec-
retary of State’s perspective concerning urgency to fulfil political commitments 
and obligations is contrasted against that of the Permanent Secretary’s attention 
to realism, namely the appraisal of the blockages and misalignments to work 
through to have policy effectively delivered. The pressures on both parties re-
quire someone independent to facilitate greater understanding between the two 
parties to ensure for on-time delivery of policy. 
7. Where from Here? 
The limitation of this study is that it is a cross-sectional qualitative investigation. 
As such, it is valid within the parameters of a particular time frame and the par-
ticipating population. Further work needs to be carried out with SpAds to iden-
tify the blockages, constraints and supports in their role, the nature of their alle-
giances and to whom and the skills and qualities required to add value.  
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